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I do not vilify theory and speculation—no, because that would be
to vilify reason itself. . . . No, whenever I speak against theory, I
mean always a weak, erroneous, fallacious, unfounded, or
imperfect theory; and one of the ways of discovering that it is a
false theory is by comparing it with practice.
Edmund Burke, Speech in Commons, 7 May 1782
Edmund Burke’s affiliation with tradition has become proverbial, and his
Reflections on the Revolution in France is a landmark within the history of
intellectual conservatism. Yet the epigraph that opens this essay illustrates the
complexity of tradition’s defense, particularly when confronted with such
seemingly unassailable virtues as those adumbrated by the revolutionary moment.
It also anticipates the divergent responses of certain contemporary writers and
thinkers who, while amenable to social reform, remained deeply skeptical of what
Burke elsewhere called the “untried policy” (33) of the radical Revolution.
Amelia Opie was such a figure, and her friendships with Mary Wollstonecraft and
William Godwin during the 1790s have prompted much critical inquiry into her
ambivalent treatment of radical ideas in her fiction. Yet, as Miriam Wallace has
indicated, much of the criticism has relied on the contemporary dichotomy—
largely framed by the English counterrevolution—between Jacobin and antiJacobin writers.1 This has been problematic for scholars seeking to rationalize
Opie’s personal affiliation with two of the age’s foremost radicals or reconcile it
with the seemingly incongruous conservatism emanating from her work.2 Indeed,
Opie resists facile classification, a task further complicated by the
counterrevolution’s application of the Jacobin label to even modest reform efforts.
The legacy of this reductive delineation has, as Catherine Packham has argued,
“prevent[ed] a fuller discussion of the historical thinking and methodologies
shared by both sides in the post-Revolutionary debates” (147). As such, Opie’s
refuge in a seemingly conservative politics, even before her conversion to the
Society of Friends in 1824, was not just defensive posturing nor, as Wallace
adroitly terms it, a “repressed, palimpsestic resistance” (208). Rather, much of
Opie’s work suggests that the conservative, loyalist disposition need not have
been opposed to a serious consideration of moral duty and social good. Such an
approach is vastly different than writing conservatively as a professional
expedient, a gambit that would ultimately have compromised the author’s artistic
autonomy and blunted her political acuity. To be sure, Opie presents a more
politically palatable response to the Revolution’s excesses. But this approach is
not a concession intended to conceal a natural affinity for revolutionary ideals as
1
2

See, in particular, 14–20.
See, for example, Wake and King.
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has often been assumed. It, instead, secures Opie’s place in a novelistic tradition
that marks the compatibility, rather than the tension, between conservatism and
reform.3
Burke posited that the prospect of arbitrary rule by absolute democracy would
prove more despotic than corrupted structures of existing government, a theme
that recurs in much Romantic-era literature dealing with the establishment—or
transgression—of sociocultural norms and institutions. Yet while popular
sentimental novels such as Hannah Foster’s The Coquette (1797) and Maria
Edgeworth’s Letters to Literary Ladies (1795) have evoked conflicting responses
regarding the punishment of their heroines for violating social norms, the focus
remains largely on the acts of transgression themselves. Thus, these texts have
been read alternately as didactic and subversive, leaving readers to ponder
questions about the object of condemnation. However, the heroines of these
novels, particularly The Coquette, seem to mimic social stereotypes of the woman
insistent on “marriage to a man with wealth and position enough to guarantee a
life of idle luxury and endless socializing” (Korobkin 79). And while any
critiques made by the authors of these novels might be directed at the society that
produces limited options and little education for women—or at the women
themselves—for heroines like The Coquette’s Eliza, “rebellion is neither a
political protest nor a strike for freedom as we would understand that term”
(Korobkin 79). In essence, the act of social rebellion does not always constitute an
overt evaluation of those systems—political, philosophical, or otherwise—that
invariably influence the social order.
What will be discussed here, then, is Amelia Opie’s post-revolutionary novel
Adeline Mowbray (1804), which, perhaps more than any of Opie’s other work,
indicates that a critique and even renunciation of radical, and in this case,
specifically Godwinian ideology does not preclude a desire to reform. However,
whereas Wallace is concerned with the novel’s “dialogic tension” and its author’s
active engagement with contemporary political debate, this study is primarily
concerned with the historical and philosophical roots of those tendencies that have
been ascribed to a latent, sometimes affected, conservatism.4 I will argue that
Opie’s novel consciously challenges the Revolution’s reflexive distrust of long3

While critics such as Grenby, Gilmartin, Rooney, and Wood have examined the broader
counterrevolutionary novel’s intellectual roots, criticism of post-revolutionary women’s writing
has typically relied on the link between the French ideals propounded by the Revolution and
British radical philosophy.
4
For examples of the latter, see Ty 145–60. Shaffer, even more succinctly, argues that following
the French Revolution, “women writers concerned about their reputations frequently apologized
for immodestly pushing themselves into print and constrained themselves to writing
conservatively only” (286).
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serving sociocultural institutions—propelled and emblematized by the influence
of the Church—as antithetical to those “Enlightenment” ideals of liberty, equality,
and justice.5
More specifically, Opie’s reform program is one that relies on the constancy of
change intrinsic to the natural world and the authority of factual historical
processes in explaining the human condition. In this context, it could remain
faithful to the lineage of Aristotelian natural law, descended through Edmund
Burke in his standard-bearing assessment of the Revolution, and be adapted to the
historical realities of English civil society and the burgeoning human rights
tradition.6 In essence, Opie goes some way toward carving out a reinvigorated
English national identity originating in right and founded not on the universalist
cosmopolitan vision popularized by the French Declaration of Right but on social
and moral codes distinctly and historically English. The historical context
surrounding the novel lent this agenda immediacy because contemporary conflicts
between libertinism and morality, order and disorder, and the spiritual and
rational had their roots, one way or another, in the debates touched off by the
Revolution and filtered through the radical pen of William Godwin. It is in Opie’s
novel that these issues are crystallized and the radical philosophies of Godwin
given a reformist’s interrogation. Most important, their fictional deployment
emphasizes Opie’s preeminence as a political philosopher amongst her
contemporaries and further elucidates the theoretical and potentially reformist
nature of the counterrevolutionary dialectic.
The novel tells the story of Adeline, introduced to readers as a young girl under
the educational tutelage of her mother Editha Mowbray and her paternal
grandmother Mrs. Woodville. While spending much of her time speculating on
the best ways to educate her daughter, Editha ultimately leaves Adeline’s practical
education to Mrs. Woodville, who, “thinking it a pity that the poor girl should
learn nothing, like, till she was to learn every thing, taught her according to the
old way” (Opie 10–11). Nevertheless, Adeline espouses the Enlightenment-tinged
social ideals promulgated—if not actually carried out—by her mother and finds
their embodiment in the philosopher Frederic Glenmurray, with whom she elopes
to the continent after being nearly assaulted by her mother’s recent husband, Sir
5

Taylor has argued that the term Enlightenment was eschewed in anti-Jacobin literature for the
more propagandistic and conspiratorial philosophism and illumination; however, while the term
itself may not yet have gone “from verb to noun” (307) during the revolutionary decade, the
principles that would now characterize the era were fully understood by many
counterrevolutionary writers, despite what Taylor views as conservative mystification in the face
of “historical complexity” (299). For this reason, I have retained the term here.
6
See Pappin.
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Patrick O’Carrol. Yet not long into their courtship, Glenmurray contracts an
illness and, before dying, insists on Adeline’s marriage to his brother Berrendale
as the only means to protect her from her former association. Adeline accedes
and, after the marriage, bears a child; Berrendale is found to have married the
daughter of a Jamaican planter, thereby releasing Adeline from her marital
obligations. Yet Adeline falls ill toward the end of the novel and entrusts the
upbringing of her daughter to her mother, having been recently reconciled to her
and offering her another chance at the education of a child. Adeline’s subsequent
death closes the novel and is the culmination of its authorial commentary, largely
and aptly demonstrated throughout by her portrayal of sanguine educational
theory, the durability of social institutions such as marriage, and the legal legacy
of customs and traditions unique to sovereign nation-states.
The binary between Enlightenment metaphysics, derided by the loyalist
opposition as speculative and utopian, and its ostensibly more empirical
counterpart is represented by the educational theories propounded by Editha and
the more practical guidance offered by Adeline’s maternal grandmother. The
description of Editha’s enthusiasm for “abstruse systems of morals and
metaphysics” and her immediate “neglect of positive duties” is directly
juxtaposed against Mrs. Woodville’s insistence on the attainment of “the trifling
yet important details . . . that women commonly know” (4) and is reflective of the
tension that affords Adeline the skills to be practically useful but unable to
ascertain those things unfit for practical use. As such, Adeline expends as much
intellectual energy imbibing, as practical guides of conduct, “these new theories,
and these romantic reveries” (14) as she does attending to those “every day
operations” (11) necessary for the overall good of those in her immediate
community. This is no more apparent than in Adeline’s exclusive attendance on
her grandmother during the elderly woman’s last illness since Editha, “with every
possible wish to be useful, had so long given way to habits of abstraction” (11).
Indeed, while privileging domestic duty carries rather androcentric undertones, it
is in keeping with the Enlightenment’s renewed emphasis on the value of raising a
responsible citizenry as well as traditionalist conceptions of the domestic as a
model for a sustainable, self-governing, and naturally ordered state.7
Furthermore, the privileging of domestic duties and practical utility answers the
maximizing principles of enlightenment collectivism and fulfills what Mark
Murphy calls the particularity desideratum of natural law. That is, “the presence
of a special tie to one’s own laws, not just to those of any political community, or
any minimally just political community” (86). Since natural law considers these
7

See Mellor.
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special ties to be included in the pursuit of an aggregative common good, the
pursuit of a singular good, in this case Adeline’s treatment of her grandmother,
does not preclude her from contributing to the common good of her given
community. Mrs. Woodville has taught Adeline the “practical principle” of
natural law, that “each person is bound to do his or her share for the common
good,” a concept fundamental to political authority (Murphy 86).
Editha’s distortion of this principle has immediate implications for the novel’s
reflection of the revolutionary debate since she, in essence, comes to personify the
anti-Jacobin caricature of the “man of the world,” defined by the universal
applicability of his ideals and his disdain for a society that could be rebuilt on
axioms and a priori deductions. French Revolution historian Hippolyte Taine, like
Burke, levied such charges against the radicals and ascribed to them the
construction of a devastating and overly reductive scientific system used to
explain arithmetically the human condition.8 The critique underscores the novel’s
rehearsal of Godwin’s “general utility,” as readers are told that Editha, “while
professing her unbounded love for the great family of the world, suffered her own
family to pine under the consciousness of her neglect” (Opie 4–5). Even more
poignant is the character’s declaration of support for the American colonists, an
arguably anti-Jacobin literary trope deployed to articulate the dangers of idle
political discourse and concomitant enthusiasm for any endeavor commenced
under the aegis of natural right. Ever the cosmopolitan, Editha “had [not] even
leisure to observe, that while she was feeling all the generous anxiety of a citizen
of the world for the sons and daughters of American independence, her own child
was imbibing, through her means, opinions dangerous to her well-being as a
member of any civilized society” (15). That Editha has sacrificed filial duty and
affection in favor of a certain cause célèbre in radical circles has ramifications
enough and would have found a sympathetic audience on either side of the
ideological divide. Yet most revealing is the dissonance expressed between the
rhetoric of the cosmopolitan ideal and those features vital to the overall stability
of individual nation-states. Again, the language here suggests a critique of the
maximizing principles on which the cosmopolitan vision was formed. It is
counterbalanced in the text by those common-good principles best articulated by a
natural-law theory independent of the secular, subjectivist models conceived by
Rousseau and adopted by French revolutionaries.9 For such thinkers and their
archetype, Editha, “Revolutionary discourse regularly [could use] the language of
the natural law to justify attacks on existing institutions” (Armenteros 111), an
appropriation objected to by anti-Jacobin factions as a pretext for inciting
revolution for its own sake. Chris Jones has also highlighted this tendency,
8
9

See McClelland 251–54.
See Tackett. For a contemporary rebuttal to Rousseau’s Discourse, see Maistre.
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suggesting that “philosophical concepts, however integral to a particular system,
became utopian and revolutionary when released from the social contexts in
which they had seemed self-evident” (13).
That Editha’s espousal and Adeline’s literalist absorption of cosmopolitan ideals
are seen to “[lay], perhaps, the foundation to herself and her mother of future
misery and disgrace” (Opie 15) speaks to their power, if not their virtue. It is
crucial to the text’s proper placement amidst the revolutionary debate that
Adeline’s rationalist effusions for a sexual relationship “with no other ties or
sanction than those of love and reason” (37) are met with “[shock] at hearing
Adeline declare that her practice should be consonant to her theory” (28). This
response from the purportedly enlightened class exposes deep divisions between
“the bold in theory, and the almost impossible in practice” (21). Yet Editha’s
admonition to her daughter is even more revealing: “Little did I think that you
were so romantic as to see no difference between amusing one’s imagination with
new theories and new systems, and acting upon them in defiance of common
custom, and the received usages of society” (41). Here Editha’s dedication to
philosophy is betrayed as an exercise of the mind, redolent of the principal
complaint put forward by the counterrevolution, that the dissemination of radical
ideals to an indiscriminate populace would not yield justice but only unrest and
disaffection.
Burke similarly accused Rousseau, arguing the seductiveness of dissent as
directly proportional to the empty rhetorical gifts of its agent: “the paradoxes of
eloquent writers, brought forth purely as a sport of fancy, to try their talents, to
rouse attention, and excite surprise, are taken up by these [revolutionaries], not in
the spirit of the original authors, as means of cultivating their taste and improving
their style” (145). Mrs. Mowbray’s indignation mimics that which Burke
imagined Rousseau would have expressed had he lived to see the Revolution,
predicting as he did that the great philosophe would indeed “be shocked at the
practical frenzy of his scholars, who in their paradoxes are servile imitators; and
even in their incredulity discover an implicit faith” (145). The similarity is
striking, and, although it cannot be said to confirm Opie’s own biases toward the
philosophical system about which she writes, it does seem to reflect a very real
objectivism regarding the consequences of its application, just or otherwise.
That Rousseau’s influence on the revolutionary character was still being felt is
evidenced by the presence of his works in the libraries of both Adeline and the
loathsome Sir Patrick. Yet while Adeline has read Rousseau’s Contrat Social, her
reading of Julie is stopped short, preventing her from viewing the novel’s overtly
didactic second half. While readers of the entire novel would have presumably
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been left to conclude that works of social and political theory must be
counterbalanced with lessons of experience, “Adeline becomes what every reader
of conduct books and exemplary novels is supposed to be: a living application and
exemplification of what she has read” (Bannet 120). Yet the omission is most
pronounced when readers are told that Sir Patrick’s literary exposure has been
limited to “dangerous French novels” and other works “calculated to inflame the
fancy and corrupt the morals” (Opie 55). Such literary fare marks Sir Patrick as
the embodiment of radicalism gone awry, using virtue as a pretense for vice and
social institutions as cover for predation and tyranny.10 It is no accident that Sir
Patrick’s attempt to corrupt the young Adeline is made through a series of lewd
books deliberately left out for her perusal.
Yet the object of such a plot device is not to satirize contemporary worries about
the baleful effects of novels on impressionable female minds. The relation of Sir
Patrick’s reading preferences allows Opie to elide the distinction between these
and the “political tracts, systems of philosophy, and other romances” (55) familiar
to Adeline. Indeed, reading any of them without proper knowledge of those
sociohistorical circumstances informing a typically “English” culture would have
constituted the very same inequitable educational structure so many progressive
writers sought to ameliorate. Most representative is perhaps Mary Wollstonecraft,
who, while promoting somewhat traditional notions of virtue and the domestic in
light of the “sentimental lust” (65) that had prevailed in France, nevertheless
recognized the double bind for women who were not properly educated and
whose virtue was reductively and exclusively equated with chastity: “it is a farce
to call any being virtuous whose virtues do not result from the exercise of its own
reason” (86). This context, then, provides purchase to narrative condemnation of
Adeline, who is, “owing to the pretty books which [Editha] let her read, living
with [Glenmurray] as his mistress, and glorying in it, as if it was a notable, praiseworthy action” (98).
As Adeline will discover, a society’s laws are more products of custom than they
are simply arbitrary legislative exercises and thus are indeed unique to any given
political community. Historian J. G. A. Pocock speaks to the evolution of British
common and constitutional law, asserting that the “ideology of the Ancient
Constitution was an elaborate set of historical arguments by which it was sought
to show that the common law, and the constitution as it now stood, had been
essentially the same since pre-Conquest times and—if the argument were pressed
home—since time immemorial, or at least since an unrecorded beginning in the
10

Many critics have noted the incongruousness of the violence committed against alleged enemies
of the Revolution and the beneficence of the general will that facilitated it. See especially Parkin
and Marshall.
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woods of Germany” (Pocock 94). Thus, Adeline’s equation of custom and what
she frequently terms “prejudice” is a false one, for the former cannot be dispensed
with, even by sudden revolt, and must be made to ally with an equitable
distribution of justice. It is, in fact, her relationship with Glenmurray that most
clearly alerts readers to the tenuous position held by apostles of the radical
movement, as the vision of a future end-state liberated from its institutional
moorings often renders the material world of the present untenable. Glenmurray
comes to symbolize this isolation, which evinces the tension between an idealist
projection of the world as it ought to be and the material experience of the world
as it is. While the philosopher ultimately defers to the practical half of the
Humean dichotomy by being “contented to do homage to ‘things as they are’”
(Opie 126), no amount of vacillation can prevent his beloved Adeline from
engineering things as they should be.
Hints of Glenmurray’s ambivalence toward his own strictures occur upon his
introduction in the novel as “neither the blamelessness of his life, nor even his
active virtue . . . were deemed sufficient to counteract the mischievous tendency
of his works” (21). Like Editha, Glenmurray has been ignorant of his
philosophy’s pragmatic underside, though upon recognizing Adeline’s impending
ruin, he expresses regret for having “led [Adeline] to a train of reasoning, so
alluring in theory, [but] so pernicious in practice” (149). This is a reiteration of his
earlier, self-abnegating reproach that “would to God I had never published” (70),
a statement that, while not disavowing Enlightenment principles entirely,
nevertheless reflects his regret for “opinions which were calculated to enlighten
[the world]” (150). As a result of her devotion to social heterodoxy, equally
admirable in its intentions, Adeline is compelled to endure with the repellent
Berrendale that very same institution she so willfully rejected.
However, the novel’s most condemnatory appraisal of the radical program occurs
when Glenmurray retrospectively adopts the language of the counterrevolution:
“as those opinions militated against the experience and custom of ages, ought I
not to have paused before I published, and kept them back till they had received
the sanction of my maturer judgment?” (150). In addition to invoking once more
the natural-law principle that custom often determines legitimate legal authority,
the allusion to his publications as the result of youthful fancy also serves to
discredit them not only as indiscreet, but as ignorant of the material wisdom
derived from communal experience.11 As Glenmurray’s protestations would
11

This statement also serves to reinforce King and Pierce’s explanation of Opie’s liberality in
constructing the ages of her principal characters, given that their inspiration, Wollstonecraft and
Godwin, were 38 and 41, respectively, when they married (note 70). However, while the editors
claim the youth of Adeline and Glenmurray is meant to evoke a sympathetic response from
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suggest, custom is not a usurper of natural justice and right but rather derives
from a society’s patterns of behavior deemed reasonable by rules of consent and
constitutive of decisive reasons for action. On this basis, it is inferred that, while
law can be changed or amended, it will be done by the cumulative and collective
actions of a given political community over a period of time.
It is of some moment, then, that the most credible and consistent voice in the text
is one of conservative opposition, found in the Quaker Mrs. Pemberton, whose
own invocation of natural law marks the coalescence of revealed truths and
historically organic systems for ordered society. Gently and somewhat
condescendingly identifying Adeline with the “pernicious doctrine,” Mrs.
Pemberton appropriates the principal criticism levied at the new philosopher:
Poor thing! I understand thee now—Thou art one of the
enlightened, as they call themselves—Thou art one of those wise
in their own conceit, who, disregarding the customs of ages, and
the dictates of experience, set up their own opinions against the
hallowed institutions of men and the will of the Most High. (122)
Augmenting the traditions of the revolutionary decade, this particular speech
would also resonate with a culture increasingly wary of rejecting material wisdom
for scientific and metaphysical knowledge.
Moreover, the treatment of theory’s place in an ordered society enables readers to
detect a realist metaphysics compatible with the counterrevolution’s appropriation
of neo-scholastic traditions. Joseph L. Pappin notes the presence of such language
at the time, arguing that “while both [Burke and Aquinas] hold to a realist
philosophy in the realm of metaphysics, both likewise recognize that an a priori
form of rationalist ethics cannot be applied to circumstances without the
intervening activity of the first of all virtues, which is prudence” (225).
Furthermore, in part given its intensified scrutiny by the British political
establishment, much of the post-revolutionary reform movement had to be
cognizant of its singular historical moment, echoing the scholastic imperative that
“the historical development of civilizations and cultures circumscribes and
designates the parameters within which we will normally act with prudence.”
(215). However, Adeline’s actions oppose such counsel, and thus her futile
universalist wish to “act independent of society” (Opie 112) becomes
paradigmatic of what Noel Reynolds refers to as the “utilitarian liberalism”
instigated by the abstract French Declaration of Right. As Reynolds comments,
readers, this speech from Glenmurray, if we are to accept the editorial note, may then also be a
damning critique of these eminently more “experienced” purveyors of the new philosophy.
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“the French declaration articulates a theory of liberty and its limitation by law in
terms of universal criteria: liberty is the power of doing whatever does not injure
another, and law should only prohibit actions that are hurtful to society”
(Reynolds 194). Adeline hopes her actions will stimulate a social regeneration
free from prejudice but ultimately begins to realize that her actions are not as
benign as their stimulus would suggest. In fact, they are seen to violate even the
utilitarian law she has so willfully imbibed.
Yet even more material to the text’s counterrevolutionary undercurrent,
Glenmurray’s disaffection toward the secularist rationalism of the European
Enlightenment has implications for not only the enduring persistence of social
institutions over time, but for the role of revealed religion during that time as well.
As Opie’s readers would have been aware, the individualism of the revolutionary
ideology was often presented with religious zeal, a final point reinforced by the
hitherto atheistic Glenmurray:
Perhaps, had I remained longer here, we might have [worshipped
together]; for though my feelings have continually hurried me into
adoration of the Supreme Being, I have often wished my homage
to be as regular and as founded on immutable conviction as it once
was: but it is too late now for amendment, though, alas! not for
regret, deep regret. (Opie 157)
Glenmurray’s conversion here confirms what had been suspected of members of
the radical Jacobin sect, that an indulgence of individual impulses, particularly
those contrary to custom’s established law, necessarily came at the expense of
natural progress and an actual, unquantifiable common good.12 For Adeline, who
admits that “with you, and you alone, is the gratification of self always a
secondary consideration” (156), peace, or in this case, happiness as a means-end
entity, is entirely self-referential, reminiscent of the Hobbesian state of nature in
which common pursuits are nonexistent and peace is desired less for its own sake
than for the cynical preservation of self (Murphy 61–62). Glenmurray, though
repentant of the errors inculcated in the name of a general good, is vindicated only
by the transference to those who survive him of the lessons of experience and the
wisdom gained by them. Before comforting the disconsolate Adeline, Mrs.
Pemberton says as much, regretting the fate of Glenmurray, “wise in thine own
conceit, who presumedst sometimes to question even the existence of the Most
High, and to set up thy vain chimeras of yesterday against the wisdom and
experience of centuries” (Opie 160). The ineluctable truths of Mrs. Pemberton
12

For more on the French Declaration as the basis of individual will and subsequent right, see
Chapter 3 of d’Entrèves.
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directly counter those proffered by Adeline, and as the text unfolds, they come to
supplant modern correctives to what are presented as natural deviations from
custom’s laws.13
Yet for Adeline, receipt of this knowledge is deferred until she prevails upon
Glenmurray to enact his own system of principles, a development only the
philosopher himself acknowledges as paradoxically prohibitive, noting
ominously, “the name of wife imposes restraint even on a libertine” (71). In this
case, he perhaps understands what an inexperienced Adeline cannot: that although
marriage may have degenerated into its current state and deserved censure, it
nevertheless afforded the kind of mobility Adeline would be without should she
proceed as intended. Wollstonecraft herself had made a similar observation and
may be argued to have influenced Opie’s consideration of marriage. She writes,
“The personal reserve, and sacred respect for cleanliness and delicacy in domestic
life, which French women almost despise, are the graceful pillars of modesty; but,
far from despising them, if the pure flame of patriotism have reached their
bosoms, they should labour to improve the morals of their fellow-citizens” (66).
Here Adeline’s protestations against marriage are not only emblematic of debates
over the institution itself, but ramified especially when placed in the context of
eighteenth-century separate sphere ideology. As Linda Colley argues, “separate
sphere rhetoric could supply a way for women to assert their important role in
British society and to protect their rights such as they were” (262–63). That the
authority granting marriage’s official sanction in the novel seems largely biblical,
that point is arguably superseded by its implications for the era’s debates over
secular morality and the moral legitimacy of the revolutionary ethos. Adeline’s
subsequent resistance is indeed revolutionary in that it deliberately undercuts an
established and lawful —not to say infallible—program of order. Yet its
catastrophic effects, melded with revolutionary regret, tend to mitigate what
would otherwise be a standard feminist interrogation of gendered hierarchy.
Instead, the object of critique becomes the ostensibly restorative revolutionary
program itself rather than those corruptions of order-preserving social institutions.
This is perhaps made most clear by Adeline’s treatment in polite society, where,
instead of being upheld as a paragon of virtue by those ostensibly “liberal and
unprejudiced persons in the world” (68), she is mocked as a “goddess” (76) and
an “angel of purity” (74) and repudiated as a kept woman. And while the conjugal
hypocrisies of those Adeline encounters offer an ingenuous critique of the
marriage state, the development of the novel’s main characters offers something
much more fundamental. Unwilling to accede to “the trammels which [society]
13

For more on the link between positive law and custom in England, see Christianson 115–84.
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imposes” (127), Adeline blithely equates reform with untempered rebellion,
scorning realities forged by civil society’s organic development. After a series of
disagreeable advances by men seeking to exploit the easy misconstrual of liberty
for avowed sexual license, the narrative tone reveals that Adeline’s rationalizing
may be as much an object of satire as sympathy. Adeline, in the tradition of Mary
Hays, wonders why, “because an idle ceremony has not been muttered over me at
the altar, [she] is liable to be thought a woman of vicious inclinations, and to be
exposed to the most daring insults” (116). At this point in the text, any negative
judgment on Adeline, if not for social heterodoxy or at least mere imprudence, is
prompted by the narrator, who seems to deride Adeline’s impractical adherence to
misdirected principle. Opie writes, “as these reflections occurred to her, she could
scarcely help regretting that her principles would not allow her delicacy and virtue
to be placed under the sacred shelter bestowed by that ceremony which she was
pleased to call idle” (116). Despite its shortcomings, also evident here, this
particular institution carries with it an authoritative protection that transcends
cultural adaptations or a professed independence of it. The reform vision is thus
left intact since to dispense completely with such a firmly rooted tradition was to
create new and perhaps even greater tyrannies.
However, Opie’s illustrations of marriage’s ignoble underside and the fact that
“[Glenmurray and Adeline’s] ‘marriage’ is superior to any other heterosexual
relationship in the novel” have been frequently cited by critics as evidence of the
author’s progressivism (Eberle 136). Yet despite narrative admission of
marriage’s tendency to “perpetuate the dearest of all monopolies” (Opie 38), it
nevertheless comes to embody the natural law tradition of the counterrevolution
by depicting the influence of human behavior over time and the fulfillment of
natural desire as the sources of society’s most determinable institutions. This can
also be seen to challenge the conceit that these institutions had been somehow
manufactured as vehicles for state control.14 That Adeline’s relationship with
Glenmurray, a model for companionable marriage and lacking nothing but
society’s imprimatur, is the most virtuous in the text is as much an endorsement
of marriage’s potential to foster equity as it is a repudiation of it as irredeemably
unjust. Adeline’s early opposition to marriage suggests as much, since it in
hindsight signaled her unqualified intent:
With an unreserve which nothing but her ignorance of the world,
and the strange education which she had received, could at all
Scott asserts the “connection between authoritarian regimes and the control of women” (47) and
offers the groundwork for a critique of the ways in which marital arrangements have been
analogized (and thereby reinforced) throughout history to construct political relationships
“between ruler and ruled” (46).
14
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excuse, [Adeline] began to declaim against marriage, as an
institution at once absurd, unjust, and immoral, and to declare that
she would never submit to so contemptible a form, or profane the
sacred ties of love by so odious and unnecessary a ceremony. (28)
The implied critique of Adeline’s resolution at this point in the text serves a dual
purpose. Adeline might be pitied her impulse and ignorance. It must be
considered, though, that her renunciation of marriage and subsequent elopement
with Glenmurray had been catalyzed by Sir Patrick’s plotted rape of Adeline,
who, while “strong in innocence” (60), realized that such license was only made
possible by Sir Patrick’s (bigamous) marriage to her mother.
Sir Patrick’s actions toward Adeline represent the convenient elasticity of the
Enlightenment’s regenerative philosophy. They also signal a critique of an
institution that, having been corrupted over time, remained socially salutary when
constructed on equitable terms. Editha’s rationalization that her marriage “was
absolutely necessary to my happiness” (50) accords with Glenmurray’s entreaty to
Adeline that “your only chance for happiness is becoming a wife” (150). Both
statements are seeming utilitarian projections of happiness that are
counterbalanced by their high cost. That cost is here manifested not only by
inequitable marriage settlements but also the depiction of libertinism granted
legitimacy by matrimonial sanction. Accordingly, Glenmurray’s assertion that “no
wife was ever more pure than Adeline” (74) suggests as much a denunciation of
“false” marriage as a renegotiation of equitable and companionate marriage in the
name of civil progress. Moreover, that Adeline is rejected as a “fallen angel” (74)
by those who have themselves taken extramarital liberties provides further
commentary on the unwarranted protection marriage affords to those wishing to
lead lives of physical self-indulgence and dissipation.
Necessarily, then, marriage as a naturally edifying social institution, and hence
one consistent with the novel’s deployment of natural-law principles, is ultimately
upheld by Adeline herself. While her repudiation of former ideals is not perhaps
as fervent as Glenmurray’s, Adeline’s holds much greater purchase, since it is
affixed to a staunch defense of that previously rejected as provincial and
disingenuous. Having been notified of Berrendale’s bigamy and her consequent
release from marriage’s confines, Adeline is effusive:
I have no doubt that there is a great deal of individual suffering in
the marriage state; but I believe that the mass of happiness and
virtue is certainly increased by it. Individual suffering, therefore, is
no more an argument for the abolition of marriage, than the
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accidental bursting of a musquet would be for the total abolition of
fire-arms. (217)
For Adeline, her release from an oppressive marriage would be to submit to the
idea of the institution as fluid and undoubtedly in line with the contractarian line
of the radicals.15 However, Adeline here seems to recognize marriage as
legitimated by the reasonable progress of ages, sanctioned by customs
cumulatively and collectively authoritative. Such methodology was not absent in
England, as James Mackintosh’s affirmation of immutable progress confirms:
“Such a body of political laws must in all countries arise out of the character and
situation of a people; they must grow with its progress, be adapted to its
peculiarities, change with its changes, and be incorporated with its habits” (236).
However, Mackintosh directly confronts the corruption of those laws born of
custom and gives pride of place to the humanist impulse as it was refracted
through a Scholastic lens, writing that “the appropriate praise of this [Christian]
religion is not so much that it has taught new duties, as that it breathes a milder
and more benevolent spirit over the whole extent of morals” (236). As is also seen
in Opie, this theory of civil society defers to wisdom gained by the experience of
ages and the authority granted by a natural civic humanism, articulated, if not
always propounded, by Christianity. Adeline’s strikingly similar exhibition of
civic humanism and “rational conviction” is directly opposed to her prior selfreferential worldview, one which confounded custom with “prejudice” and
impelled her to renounce the former rather than seek to reform the latter.
Eradication or denial of the system itself, as evidenced by Adeline’s story, breeds
greater tyrannies and loss of the authority that, in its ideal state, preserves the
natural liberties of the individual.
In this way, the novel confronts the typical reluctance of critics to admit “any
evidence of conservative bias on Opie’s part” (King and Pierce, xii ), ultimately
asserting that marriage, when based on cultivated affections and upheld by
mutually equitable obligations, serves a greater overall good than a wholesale—
and predominantly self-satisfying—renunciation of it. As Adeline argues, “it
follows that marriage must be more beneficial to society in its consequences, than
connections capable of being dissolved at pleasure; because it has a tendency to
call forth and exercise the affections, and control the passions” (Opie 237). Here,
the seeming restraints imposed by such obligations serve as an anodyne to the
otherwise unchecked passions that, inevitably expanding into other realms of civil
society, promote social decay and breed tyranny. Adeline says as much in the
ensuing paragraphs, finally concluding that “marriage is a wise and ought to be a
15

See White 80–84.
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sacred institution; and I bitterly regret the hour when . . . I dared to think and act
contrary to this opinion” (238). Given the social and historical context of the
novel, then, Adeline’s “fatal error of opinion” (237) regarding marriage may serve
as a representative critique of revolutionary means, and she would perhaps have
agreed with Burke “that no man should approach to look into its defects or
corruptions but with due caution” and, furthermore, “that he should never dream
of beginning its reformation by its subversion” (82).
However, it must be remembered that Adeline’s vision throughout had been the
overall improvement of her society, an admirable exercise in light of the social
and political stagnation that followed closely on the heels of the French
Revolution. Hence Eleanor Ty’s assertion that Opie may be viewed “as an author
who sympathized with and understood what the radicals were espousing, but who
remained distant enough to perceive the difficulties of practicing their theories
without there being changes in society at large” (151). It is precisely this point,
however, which may tend to oversimplify Opie’s apprehension of radical ideals
and undermine her vision for an equitable society, one that deliberately distanced
itself from the revolutionary program. Her heroine’s statements, it would seem,
suggest that the construction of a reinvigorated reformist culture must now be the
product of the steady presence of historical contexts fused with the organically
progressive elements of generational legacies.
Quite appropriately, then, Adeline must sacrifice her happiness for the benefit of a
greater future good, clearly manifested by the prospects of her daughter by
Berrendale, the aptly named Editha. For Adeline, social progress and the roots of
reform are founded in the cumulative knowledge of generations and deference to
the inevitable directives of experience. At this late point in the text, the emphasis
on Adeline’s education comes full circle, as the heroine advances a system in
which personal gratification or self-indulgence—however principled it may
seem—must not be pursued in opposition to the more natural impulses of
constancy and maternal duty. She reasons, “it is evident that on the education
given to children must depend the welfare of the community; and consequently,
that whatever is likely to induce parents to neglect the education of their children
must be hurtful to the welfare of the community” (237). Adeline’s former
principles violated these dictates in much the same way her mother’s did. Despite
their intent, they are seen in the text as most harmful for their abnegation of filial
duties.
Such is the wisdom which Adeline bequeaths to her daughter, as she, like
Glenmurray, cannot live to see her past offenses expiated by her own contrition.
Her mistakes become part of the education of the young Editha, whose lessons

Published by Scholar Commons, 2021

15

ABO: Interactive Journal for Women in the Arts, 1640-1830, Vol. 11 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 4

need not be learned solely by her own experience, but that of her mother before
her. Yet the effects of her actions are lasting, and Adeline realizes the harmful
legacy they will leave for her daughter, in spite of her renunciation of them: “I
was as great a stumbling block to others as if the life I led had been owing to the
influence of lawless desires” (239). Thus, should Adeline live to undertake the
education of young Editha, her presence will serve merely to symbolize the
incongruity of her past life to her current principles: “Even if I were not conscious
of having by my example led another into the path of sin, still, for my child’s sake
I should wish to die” (240). In essence, the motives for her actions are superseded
by the actions themselves, and consequently her continued presence in the life of
her daughter will be a hindrance to her practical education.
Because Adeline’s fate, like Glenmurray’s before her, is bound to those principles
she so steadfastly espoused, it is ultimately Mrs. Mowbray who is offered
atonement, reminded as she is by Mrs. Pemberton that “thy daughter’s faults
originated in thee! her education was cruelly defective” (250). And in a seeming
nod to a Burkean empiricism, readers are left to conclude what Editha could only
in hindsight: “how necessary was to [Adeline] the warning voice of judgment and
experience!” (251). Here Opie combines the pervasive emphasis on children’s
education with the continued critique of the effects of the radical philosophy. In
doing so, she also suggests the possibility for vindication through the advent of a
new generation, appositely represented by Mrs. Mowbray’s young namesake.
Having lived long enough to regret her life’s course of action, Adeline, before her
death, channels the Quaker Mrs. Pemberton, marking a more classical
“revolution” back to those childhood instincts contravened by her mother’s
educational theory: “Oh! teach my Editha to be humble, teach her to be slow to
call the experience of ages contemptible prejudices; teach her no opinions that can
destroy her sympathies with general society, and make her an alien to the hearts
of those amongst whom she lives” (259). Adeline has deferred to the dictates of
custom as the natural offspring of a civilized society and recognizes the presence
of each individual within his or her political community as essential to its
continued progress. By demonstrating the alienating and divisive effects of a
complete rupture of normative codes, Opie reinforces the notion that the vitality
of a culture is the product of its roots and that recourse to any violations of natural
right and justice must include due consideration of them.
Such an approach grants that the source and exercise of legislative authority are
indeed imperfect and, in some cases, unjust, but they are nevertheless informed by
the customs of a distinctive English society. While detractors would ascribe to the
defense of such a system those isolationist and provincial tendencies forsworn by
the revolutionary establishment, Opie, in fact, combines this somewhat more
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nationalistic vision of custom with the realist notion that right derives from that
custom’s origination of rights-preserving law. The author also seeks to rescue the
fading hope of social reform from the jaws of revolution, affirming the continued
progress of the civilized state by obedience to those laws made manifest by
custom, practical reason, and moral prudence. In this way, the novel is
revolutionary in a more classical sense than those of Opie’s radical forerunners in
that it envisions a society returned to its pre-revolutionary ideals based on the
collective and practical actions of its citizens. In an epoch that commonly rejected
history and tradition as inimical to social and political progress, Opie’s
conservative turn in many ways emerges as an innovation well suited for lasting
and meaningful reform.
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